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Abstract
Displacement and exile have been recurrent and durable 
phenomena aff ecting Iraqi society for the last 90 years. 
Th e process of forming an Iraqi state from the ruins of the 
Ottoman empire, which Aristide Zolberg has analyzed as 
a prime factor generating refugee fl ows,1 has been ongoing 
since 1920. Unfi nished endeavours to build a state and 
nation have been characterized by almost incessant antag-
onistic claims over the nature of the state and national 
identity, the exercise of and access to political power, con-
trol of natural resources and border sovereignty. Political 
repression, violent regime change, redefi nition of national 
identity, demographic engineering, and domestic or inter-
national armed confl icts have resulted in eviction, depor-
tation, denaturalization, political emigration, and fl ight 
from violence. A large part of displacement in Iraq has 
been internal. But vast numbers of refugees and exiles 
have also formed a regional and global diaspora extending 
from Iran, Jordan, Israel, Syria, all the way to such distant 
emigration countries as New Zealand.
Résumé
La société irakienne est aff ectée depuis 90 ans de façon 
continue et prégnante par des déplacements de population 
et l’exil. Depuis le démembrement de l’empire ottoman en 
1920, un état irakien a continuellement tenté de se consti-
tuer, ce qui a été analysé et identifi é par Aristide Zolberg 
comme étant la source principale des mouvements de réfu-
giés. Les eff orts pour construire un état et une nation en 
Irak ont constamment été minés par des revendications 
contradictoires et des luttes portant sur les questions de 
la nature de l’état, de l’identité nationale, de l’exercice 
et de l’accessibilité du pouvoir politique, du contrôle des 
ressources naturelles et de la souveraineté des frontières. 
La répression politique, les changements violents de régi-
mes, les redéfi nitions de l’identité nationale, les politiques 
démographiques, et les confl its armés régionaux et inter-
nationaux ont entraîné des évictions, des déportations, la 
dénaturalisation, l’émigration politique et la fuite devant 
la violence. Une grande proportion des déplacements de 
populations irakiennes est intérieure au pays. Toutefois, 
un nombre important de réfugiés et d’exilés forme une 
diaspora régionale et internationale qui s’étend à l’Iran, la 
Jordanie, Israël, la Syrie, et jusqu’à des pays d’immigration 
aussi éloigné que la Nouvelle-Zélande.
Belated Recognition of Iraqi Displacement
Despite their massive scale, displacement and other forms of 
involuntary migration from Iraq have so far largely escaped 
academic interest as topics in their own right. Th is is in 
sharp contrast with the large body of research devoted to 
Palestinian refugees. References to displacement within and 
from Iraq do exist, but they are scarce and scattered: they 
generally document displacement in relation to particular 
ethnicities or sects, episodes of confl icts, or political strug-
gles.2 So far, there has been little attempt to conceptualize 
Iraqi displacement as a political and social phenomenon or 
refl ect on its historical depth and global scope.3
Th e displacement that resulted, directly or indirectly, from 
the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime by a US-led coali-
tion in April 2003 has appeared to most scholars as a crisis 
of unprecedented scale. Although many Iraqis started leav-
ing the country as early as 2003, it was only in 2007, at the 
height of sectarian tensions and generalized insecurity, that 
advocacy and humanitarian organizations started releasing 
reports on Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries. Th ey 
particularly focused on Syria and Jordan, where the major-
ity had fl ed, generating media coverage, especially in the US 
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and UK, and a new interest from the part of mostly young 
scholars. Th e corpus of academic publications focusing on 
the post-2003 displacement trend has since been growing.4
It will come as no surprise that the 2007 surge of interest 
in Iraqi refugees closely corresponded with the beginning 
of humanitarian and policy engagement from the offi  ce of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
large donors, particularly the US and the European Union. 
Since then, research on Iraqis refugees has been largely 
policy driven, by or from the perspective of humanitarian 
aid agencies or refugee advocacy organizations. Th ere are 
many justifi cations in favour of the policy bias in refugee 
research.5 Th ere are also several shortcomings. In 2008, at 
a time when scholars were still mostly focusing on refugees 
in formal camps, and oft en limited their interest to refugee 
policy issues, Oliver Bakewell made a plea for researching 
forced migrants without using preconceptions.6 He convin-
cingly argued for considering the large number of self-set-
tled refugees and aspects of their lives other than their inter-
action with aid programs, which tended to remain invisible 
to scholars.7
Th e new academic interest in self-settled refugees had in 
fact emerged in the early 2000s, inspired by the policy con-
cerns of UNHCR which, in 1997, had issued its fi rst policy on 
refugees in urban areas. However, scholarly publications on 
the belated recognition of the presence of refugees in cities 
only started to be available during the mid-2000s. Th is new 
area of refugee research has fl ourished in recent years due 
to the realization by a number of ground-breaking scholars 
that, in developing countries, the number of refugees found 
in non-camp settings, and particularly in urban areas, has 
increased considerably and that the paradigms used to 
understand the predicament of encamped refugees are not 
applicable to urban contexts. Beyond creating knowledge 
that refl ects more closely the variegated experience of refu-
gees, this approach also responds to the ethical imperative 
of better informing humanitarian policy to make it more 
relevant and likely to promote durable solutions for refugees.
Urban Refugee Studies Rises Up Agenda
Most humans now live in towns and cities. As the world 
urbanizes, so too do patterns of displacement. Increasingly, 
refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) are not living in camps and rural areas but 
in towns and cities. Th ey usually reside in impoverished 
neighbourhoods where governments are already struggling 
to provide their own citizens with basic services.
In recent years the growing attention to the phenomenon 
of displacement to urban areas is refl ected in a spate of spe-
cial issues of displacement-focused publications.8 In part, 
this interest has been fuelled by the decision of the High 
Commissioner to focus on the subject for the annual dia-
logue convened by UNHCR in 2009. Urban refugee studies 
has gained traction and legitimacy as a subfi eld of refugee 
and forced-migration research, structured around a number 
of established scholars, and a growing bulk of literature. Th e 
fi eld has developed analytical paradigms to reach a socio-
logical understanding of specifi c refugee situations.
In urban areas most governments of host countries 
leave the management of refugees to UNHCR. Th e refu-
gee agency oft en fi nds itself unable to provide the degree of 
protection and assistance it commonly provides in camps. 
Refugees may be hard to access. As their presence is oft en 
unauthorized, many keep a low profi le and remain unregis-
tered. Many host governments continue to regard camps 
as the only legitimate space for refugees, and UNHCR has 
tended, at least de facto, to adhere to this view. Oft en it has 
had little choice except to do so in the face of determined 
governments.
Many refugees, like IDPs, fi nd urban settings attractive, 
off ering better livelihood, social and self-suffi  ciency oppor-
tunities than rural or camp settings. Outside of the physical 
and legal space of camps, refugees in cities are oft en not 
granted a legal status under international or domestic law, 
thus remaining unprotected. For many the main conse-
quence of lack of protection is having to pay bribes to gov-
ernment offi  cials to move about cities, to trade, or to seek 
work. In urban areas, governments and political parties may 
frame refugees (as well as migrants and IDPs) as security 
threats to the existing social and economic fabric and strive 
to maintain their segregation to prevent their long-term 
settlement and integration. By implying that urban refu-
gees should be contained, and that their stay is temporary, 
governments deny the possibility of accession to citizen-
ship.  Deemed a burden on national resources and oft en 
demonized, urban and other out-of-camp refugees may be 
faced with arbitrary state action and a hostile environment 
that creates xenophobia and fear among the refugees. Th is 
forces the refugees to seek anonymity, generally in urban 
slums, and adopt strategies of identity or physical con-
cealment. As a result, refugees are prevented from access 
to existing services and decent livelihoods. Jacobsen9 and 
others have stressed that urban refugees could be an asset 
to regional economies if legal avenues were opened to allow 
them to pursue productive lives within formal frameworks. 
Fábos and Kibreab10 point to the development of trans-
national spaces within which refugees may rely on, or con-
tribute to, remittances and other forms of support from 
social networks, oft en family based. Th ey further note that 
refugees are oft en part of mixed-migration movements.
Th e urban turn in refugee studies, but also in advocacy, has 
had a strong impact on policy. In recent years, international 
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emergency NGOs, together with UNHCR, have strived 
to adapt protection and assistance, the two pillars of their 
actions, to the challenges of operating in an urban environ-
ment. Th ey have found it diffi  cult to assess the needs of refu-
gees intermixed among the population of the host country, 
to distinguish refugees, IDPs and migrants, and to deliver 
aid to those who either do not necessarily want to be identi-
fi ed or are extremely hard to identify as they live on urban 
peripheries far from UNHCR offi  ces.
Iraq Displacement Hastens Policy Change
UNHCR recognized that the Iraqi refugee crisis was the big-
gest urban refugee crisis it had ever been obliged to address. 
Th e agency’s reports of its operations in the main host coun-
tries of the Middle East, namely Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, 
have also made it abundantly apparent that the crisis is dif-
ferent from previous urban refugee situations. Th e profi le 
of the refugees, in their majority from the urban middle 
class, and the operational environment resulting from the 
development levels of Iraq and regional host states, together 
with the latter’s reception policies for Iraqis, have presented 
humanitarian actors with some unprecedented challenges 
to existing protection and assistance models. Furthermore, 
the high political profi le of the crisis, particularly in the US, 
has generated a donor response signifi cantly greater than 
for other UNHCR caseload of urban refugees and IDPs. 
All these factors have allowed the agency to test new and 
costly approaches for delivering assistance, such as system-
atic outreach eff orts, the provision of services to refugees 
and nationals alike on the basis of vulnerabilities, partner-
ship with local NGOs,11 informing refugees via SMS or 
delivering cash through ATMs and employing refugees as 
outreach workers and counsellors.12 It is unlikely that these 
new models will be easily replicable in other urban refugee 
situations where funding levels for assistance are lower, the 
operational context in host countries is less favourable, and 
refugees have a more typical third-world profi le.
Operations in favour of Iraqi refugees have also prompted 
UNHCR to revise its much-criticized urban policy, launch-
ing a new Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in 
Urban Areas in September 2009. Its roll-out correlated with 
the expansion of the refugee agency’s activities in favour 
of Iraqi refugees. However the Iraqi refugee crisis raises 
questions about the universality of the new urban refugee 
policy. Th e document acknowledges the need to adapt to 
the specifi c context and the circumstances, capacities, and 
vulnerabilities of diff erent groups and individuals within 
the refugee population. It provides a checklist to assess pro-
tection risks and vulnerabilities, describing in detail what 
these risks can be in extreme circumstances. On the other 
hand, very little guidance is given on how to identify and 
assess risks and vulnerabilities in situations where refugees 
are moving between middle-income countries, and where 
the protection environment is more favourable yet far from 
guaranteeing local durable solutions for refugees.
Cumulative Causes of Displacement
A consideration of the causes of displacement, which are 
extremely varied, helps understand the untypical profi le 
of Iraqi refugees. As early as 2003, several thousands of 
political émigrés who were close associates of the Saddam 
Hussein regime left  with their families and assets to fi nd 
refuge in Arab countries, particularly Syria and Yemen, 
which welcomed them and off ered them a stable status. Th at 
same year, the dismantlement of the Iraqi army and the 
order, passed by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, 
to remove all public sector employees who had been mem-
bers in the Baath party left  over half a million Iraqis without 
an income and disenfranchised. Among them were large 
numbers of professionals, such as medical doctors, engin-
eers, teachers, and university professors. Furthermore, the 
lift ing of the international embargo, imposed on Iraq by 
the UN-Security Council in 1990, gave way to a neo-liberal 
order which made the professional conversion of former 
civil servants diffi  cult.13 Th is situation was compounded by 
an assassination campaign targeting secular intellectuals 
and professionals. Factors have therefore combined to force 
or convince tens of thousands of middle-class Iraqis to seek 
security and employment abroad, particularly in other Arab 
countries, from Jordan and Egypt all the way to the Gulf.
Th e major impetus for displacement was however the 
sectarian killings and cleansing aff ecting several areas of 
Iraq, particularly Baghdad, in 2006–8. During those years, 
Syria, the only country of the region with borders still uni-
versally open to Iraqis, received the largest number of refu-
gees. Within this group, socio-economic and geographical 
backgrounds have been more varied than among political 
émigrés and professionals; however the majority still ori-
ginates from the Baghdad middle class. Less economically 
or socially privileged Iraqis forced into displacement have 
remained inside the country as IDPs.
Further factors convincing many Iraqis to take the deci-
sion to leave are the constant deterioration of public services 
(at the time of writing, Baghdad only receives four hours 
of electricity a day) and the growing rate of unemployment 
(close to 30 percent). For many, it is a combination of vari-
ous types of insecurity—physical, social, and economic—
together with a sense of alienation from the new political 
and religious order now prevalent in Iraq that has prompted 
their departure and still prevents them from considering 
return a viable option.
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Th e pattern of displacement has not been a sudden and 
vast movement of people across borders, limited in time. 
Rather, it has been a constant out-migration since 2003, with 
a peak in 2006–7. Entire family groups have left  with chil-
dren and, at times, aging parents. Most did not fl ee abroad 
reactively, but aft er pondering their decision and making 
preparations, including selling properties. In several cases, 
the decision to leave Iraq came aft er an initial episode of 
internal displacement.
Mixed Migration and Patterns of Mobility
Iraqi refugees have to be understood as part of a large fl ow 
of mixed migration created by the major geopolitical and 
economic reconfi guration of Iraq which the US interven-
tion has prompted. Th e integration of Iraq within the global 
free market, the war and reconstruction economy, and the 
possibility of travelling outside the country, strictly con-
trolled under the Baath, aff orded new opportunities for 
Iraqis with capital to invest in real estate and the private sec-
tor of neighbouring states, and in cross-border trade. Th is 
capital fl ow has benefi tted the economies of countries host-
ing refugees from Iraq. Already in 2004–5, Iraqi businesses 
and community organizations started becoming highly vis-
ible in Damascus and Amman, the two major urban centres 
where refugees from Iraq have moved. Many of those Iraqis 
who left  with fi nancial and/or professional assets were able 
to successfully invest in other Arab countries, in some cases 
creating employment opportunities for less affl  uent refugees, 
generally in the informal sector. Th is has particularly been 
the case in areas of Damascus where Iraqis have gathered.
Not all Iraqi capital holders with a foothold in another 
Arab country are refugees. Many business entrepreneurs 
operate between Iraq, a base in the region, and the inter-
national market, and keep their families in security in 
Beirut, Amman, Cairo, the Gulf, or even a Western country. 
Dual residence is also a common feature of the Iraqi polit-
ical class with duties carried out in Iraq, and family life lived 
elsewhere, including in the more affl  uent Arab capitals that 
also host refugees. Furthermore, Damascus, Amman, and 
Beirut play hub to activities for large numbers of tempor-
ary visitors from Iraq: patients seeking high quality medical 
care, university students pursuing an education, pilgrims to 
Shiite shrines in the Syrian capital, holiday visitors escaping 
the summer heat at home, and so on.14
Migration Regimes Sharpen Socio-economic 
Diff erences
Overwhelmingly from the middle and upper classes, and 
with urban backgrounds, Iraqi refugees originate from 
a middle-income, oil-producing country with what were, 
at one time, good social and education services, which 
progressively deteriorated over several decades due to the 
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the international sanctions 
applied between 1990 and 2003, and the US-led invasion. 
Th e refugees have fi rst-world expectations in terms of liv-
ing standards, medical care, and quality of education for 
their children. Exile has sharpened social stratifi cation 
between those who have maintained socio-economic status 
and those who have not, creating anxieties and uncertainty 
among the latter.
Th e Arab states receiving Iraqi refugees are themselves 
middle-income countries generally experiencing a crisis of 
the welfare state and increasingly adopting neo-liberal poli-
cies. Th ey have a vested interest in off ering privileged access 
and status to Iraqis with capital to invest or to spend on the 
local market and services, regardless of the reasons why 
they have come to stay. Each of these countries, particularly 
those sharing a border with Iraq, also envision their policy 
vis-à-vis Iraqis willing to enter or stay on their territory 
within specifi c geopolitical and domestic agendas. None 
of the main host countries receives Iraqis within a refugee 
regime. Rather, Iraqis are fi tted within migration regimes 
that tend to favour those with fi nancial, professional, or pol-
itical assets.
Syria has been the most inclusive host facilitating the 
near universal entry of Iraqis, and the delivery and renewal 
of one-year residence. Th e government has also off ered 
Syrian passports to high-level Iraqi Baathists. By contrast, 
Lebanon only allows entry to Iraqis with fi nancial means, 
and has requested that those who want to stay long-term 
fi nd a local sponsor to be granted residence permits. Many 
Iraqis who entered illegally or remained without a spon-
sor have been detained. Jordan and Egypt restrict entry 
based on fi nancial means or professional guarantees. Th ey 
grant one-year residence to holders of fi nancial capital or 
legal work contracts. Th e authorities however apply a toler-
ance regime to Iraqis inside the country who fail to meet 
residence requirements, and they refrain from systematic 
detention or deportation.
In all cases, because Iraqis are treated as migrants, their 
access to the work market is governed by labour laws apply-
ing to foreigners. Th e general trend has been to deny work 
permits to Iraqis except in professions where skills are in 
demand. Since labour markets in host countries are already 
congested, and unemployment high in sectors where 
educated Iraqis have competences, vast numbers of refu-
gees have been left  without employment or forced to seek 
informal jobs below their qualifi cations. Th is has greatly 
contributed to the sense of insecurity and anxiety of Iraqi 
individuals and families who have used their savings and 
survive on remittances from relatives in Iraq or the diaspora 
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to strive to maintain living standards, particularly quality 
education for their children.
As migrants, Iraqis are free to settle where they wish, in 
urban or rural areas, and to rent or even buy properties 
when then can so aff ord. Residential patterns refl ect socio-
economic status, real or aspired, as many Iraqis make des-
perate fi nancial eff orts not to move to less affl  uent areas 
in large Arab cities. Iraqi neighbourhoods have developed 
in the centre or the periphery of Damascus, Amman and 
Cairo with ethnic businesses catering for the needs of the 
new residents.15 In Amman, for example, Iraqis are known 
to be scattered across the city. Th e most affl  uent ones clus-
ter in a number of residential neighbourhoods in the west 
part of the capital where a high-end Iraqi business area has 
also developed. Less well off  Iraqis have regrouped along-
side poorer Jordanians, Palestinian refugees, and labour 
migrants in the eastern part of Amman. Th is is also where 
local and international NGOs have concentrated their social 
services.
Refugee Policy and Assistance
UNHCR operates through agreements or memorandums 
of understanding with Arab host governments whereby 
responsibilities for refugee assistance and protection are 
shared. Michael Kagan provides an in-depth analysis of the 
modalities and implications of UNHCR’s role as a “surro-
gate state’ in the Middle East.”16 He also sees the Iraqi refu-
gee crisis as exemplifying the “grant compromise” of global 
refugee policy, namely burden sharing: high donor interest 
has allowed UNHCR to mobilize considerable resources 
channelled to services for refugees delivered by the UN refu-
gee agency, international NGOs, or host governments.
However, there are marked diff erences between host 
countries in their willingness to open state-run services 
to Iraqis. Syria and Jordan allow Iraqis to use government 
medical facilities and schools regardless of their residence 
status and situation vis-à-vis UNHCR. In Jordan and, to 
a lesser extent, Syria, the vast amount of international aid 
generated by the Iraqi refugee crisis has served to upgrade 
public facilities that benefi t host-country nationals more 
than the refugees from Iraq.17 By contrast, Lebanon has 
opened public schools and medical facilities only to Iraqis 
registered with the UN refugee agency, whereas Egypt 
has closed access for all Iraqis to public services and has 
impeded alternative service provision by NGOs. UNHCR 
also directly operates programs such as the delivery of cash 
assistance to needy refugees, and has set up mechanisms to 
coordinate between diff erent assistance providers.
Syria does not fi t neatly into Kagan’s analysis. Th e coun-
try’s almost constant open-door policy to Iraqi refugees, and 
the universal access it grants them to public facilities while 
receiving much less donors’ assistance than Jordan, require 
a consideration of the country’s regional and international 
political agendas. In general, it can be argued that the rela-
tive favourable “protection space’ aff orded underprivileged 
Iraqi refugees by host countries is as much the result of eco-
nomic and geopolitical calculations by host governments as 
the eff ect of international assistance and UNHCR’s assump-
tion of the role of a surrogate state.
Resettlement and Asylum
Th e high interest of resettlement states is the second pillar of 
the “grand compromise” between regional host states and 
Northern donors. All Arab host countries envision the stay 
of Iraqis, particularly those dependant on assistance, as tem-
porary and rule out naturalization.18 Even Iraqis with assets 
and a residence permit share with their less advantaged co-
nationals a feeling of uncertainty about the future because 
there is no guarantee that host states will not shift  policy 
and force them to return to Iraq. Th e current instability in 
the region, particularly in Syria and Egypt, exacerbates this 
feeling and it appears that refugees have returned to Iraq in 
unprecedented numbers over the fi rst quarter of 2012.19 In 
this context, probably the main reason why Iraqis register 
with UNHCR is to access third-country resettlement.
Th e resettlement program has taken up a large amount of 
UNHCR staff  time and fi nancial resources. In 2010, Iraqis 
were the largest group of benefi ciaries of UNHCR-facilitated 
third-country resettlement programs (26,700).20 Th e US 
has accepted far more Iraqis than the other developed coun-
try (including Canada, the Nordic countries, Australia and 
New Zealand) that each year participates in the program.21 
As of April 2012, 58,810 Iraqi refugees had arrived in the 
US. Numbers have been declining since arrivals peaked in 
2009.22 Th e process has been extremely slow with a large 
number of Iraqis waiting well over a year between admis-
sion and actual resettlement because of several levels of 
security screening.23 Th is delay maintains Iraqi individ-
uals and families in an unbearable situation of uncertainty, 
keeping them dependent on humanitarian assistance or 
depletion of personal resources; thwarts their eff orts to plan 
for their future and, oft en, that of their children; and forces 
an increasing number to return to Iraq where insecurity 
still prevails.
While the US has been the main resettlement country, 
Western European states have received the largest number 
of in-country asylum applications from Iraqis, with Sweden 
topping the list. Another unusual aspect of the ongoing 
crisis of Iraqi displacement is that there are considerable 
numbers of Iraqi asylum seekers whose claims have been 
refused but who are in a legal limbo as European states seek 
to enforce decisions to forcibly return them to Iraq—despite 
 Editorial 
7
UNHCR advocacy. Judgments in 2010 by the European 
Court of Human Rights blocking forced returns were fol-
lowed by a resolution of the Iraqi parliament in June 2012 
banning the forced return of tens of thousands of failed asy-
lum seekers and threatening to fi ne airlines that take part 
in deportation programs. Th ere appears to be no precedent 
for the post-crisis legislature of a refugee-producing state to 
refuse to take back its own nationals.
Assumptions about Refugees’ Needs
Th e unusual profi le and fi rst-world expectations of the 
refugees, the desire of governments to assert control and 
sovereignty over humanitarian intervention, and the role 
UNHCR has come to assume as a “surrogate state” for non-
Palestinian refugees in the region have rendered models 
developed to respond to the needs of urban refugees in 
extremely diff erent circumstances ill-fi tted to the situation 
of the Iraqis.
Interventions initially proceeded from a series of 
assumptions about the needs and vulnerability of the refu-
gees. In its early stages, programming was emergency-ori-
ented and aimed at meeting such needs as access to primary 
health care and basic education. Refugees were thought to 
be at threat of arrest and detention, refoulement, harass-
ment, exploitation, discrimination, and vulnerability to 
sexual and gender-based violence. Over the last two years, 
UNHCR and its implementing partners have made con-
siderable progress in refi ning their approach, responding to 
Iraqi refugees’ actual needs: secondary and tertiary health-
care psychosocial programs (particularly mental health for 
survivors of torture), remedial and higher education, skills 
maintenance and development.
“Guesstimating” Numbers
Arguably, the most diffi  cult assumption to dislodge has been 
that there are vast numbers of unregistered Iraqi refugees, 
fearful and in hiding among the host population. Indeed, 
the original estimates of the number of Iraqi refugees put 
forward by host countries at the April 2007 donor confer-
ence organized in Geneva by UNHCR were above two mil-
lion. In 2009, the number of registrations with UNHCR 
peaked at just above 310,000 throughout the Middle East, 
with 220,000 in Syria and 52,000 in Jordan. When the 
expected number of refugees failed to register, humanitar-
ian actors, advocacy organizations, the international media, 
and refugee scholars all concurred that uncounted num-
bers of Iraqis were in hiding in the cities, fearing arrest and 
deportation.
UNHCR and NGOs inaugurated outreach programs that 
considerably stretched their human and fi nancial resources 
to try to locate these “invisible” refugees and convince them 
to register. However, aft er a couple of years of these costly 
eff orts, concerned agencies came to admit that, at least in 
Syria and Jordan, over 90 percent of those Iraqis in need of 
protection and/or assistance were already registered.
Th is is not to say that the fi gure of 310,000 represents 90 
percent of Iraqis who left  to escape political or criminal vio-
lence, or the new social, moral, and economic order brought 
about by the change of regime, which for many has proven 
disorientating. However, it is likely that other Iraqis who 
have relocated from Iraq without seeking registration with 
refugee or asylum agencies have to be approached in terms 
diff erent from those off ered by both the international refu-
gee regime and refugee studies.
Diffi  culty in estimating numbers of refuges is com-
pounded by the mixed nature of Iraqi migration to neigh-
bouring countries and the circulation of refugees between a 
host country and Iraq.24 Th is situation is not unlike that of 
other refugee crises worldwide aft er the intensity of confl ict 
decreases. Afghanistan provides another major example of 
the phenomenon.
Policy Eff ects of Infl ated Numbers
Th ere has been much discussion about the size of the Iraqi 
refugee population as well as a tendency among practition-
ers and scholars to base accounts, assessments, narratives, 
and analysis on the highest fi gures publicized by host gov-
ernments.25 Th ere has also been much debate behind closed 
humanitarian doors and academic institutions about the 
relevance of speculating on the number of refugees when 
what mattered was the amount of suff ering the displace-
ment experience was infl icting.
Th ere are at least some reasons for arguing that infl ating 
the number of refugees has had direct detrimental eff ects on 
their immediate well-being and future. Kate Washington 
and Harriet Dodd,26 refl ecting on their experience working 
with a large international NGO in Jordan since 2007, con-
cur that the adherence of large donors and UNHCR to very 
high fi gures—up to 750,000 Iraqis in Jordan at some point—
negatively impacted the capacity of operational aid agencies 
to plan, tailor, and implement programs in the best inter-
est of the refugees. Th e disproportionately large amount of 
funding fl owing from donors, particularly the US govern-
ment, also had negative consequences: the rapid expansion 
of agencies applying ready-made models and the resistance 
to change in approach even as it became obvious that the 
Iraqi refugee situation was not, except maybe in its very early 
stage, a humanitarian crisis; competition between NGOs 
for, and retention of Iraqi benefi ciaries; agencies focusing on 
meeting pre-developed targets rather than on quality and 
goal of the services; the diffi  culty of developing a sustain-
able strategy focused on a realistic number of benefi ciaries; 
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and the development of an assistance-seeking behaviour in 
the Iraqi community. With some nuances, these remarks 
are equally valid for Syria.27
Th e perception of the Iraqi refugees by host commun-
ities has also been aff ected by their representation in offi  cial 
discourse, in the media, and by many international NGOs 
as hordes of people preying on scarce national resources 
or as potential exporters of the kind of sectarian confl ict 
which raged in Iraq in 2006–7.28 Th ese representations have, 
in several cases, created xenophobia and tensions between 
nationals and refugees. Th ey have also provided justifi ca-
tion for authoritarian governments to enhance their security 
apparatus and restrict the entry of Iraqis fl eeing violence.29 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, these patterns are 
being reproduced in relation to Syrians seeking refuge in 
neighbouring countries while fl eeing massacres and repres-
sion at home. Th ese misconceptions have also undermined 
advocacy eff orts by UNHCR and international NGOs to 
encourage host governments to support refugees’ self-
suffi  ciency through allocation of work permits, vocational 
training, or credit schemes for small businesses. Which 
government, anywhere in the world, would willingly open 
its formal labour market to a foreign work force thought to 
represent up to 10 percent of the national workforce?
Another distorting eff ect of infl ated numbers has been 
sidelining of UNHCR resettlement endeavours and the 
fact that the program has provided ammunition to critics 
of the US intervention in Iraq. In January 2011, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres stated that 
60,000 Iraqi refugees had departed to resettlement coun-
tries while another 60,000 were still in need of resettlement. 
In statistical terms, there are at least two contrasting ways 
of measuring the overall resettlement eff orts. One is to look 
at the ratio of resettled refugees to the numbers of Iraqi 
refugees—according to host governments about two mil-
lion. Th is would represent 3 percent of the total estimated 
refugees already resettled, and another 3 percent in need of 
resettlement. Th e other way is to take as a basis the number 
of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR throughout the 
region. If and when the target of 120,000 is met, 40 percent 
of the total number of Iraqi refugees registered in 2009, or 
46 percent of those registered in early 2011, will have been 
resettled. Considering the unreliability of the estimates 
used by host governments, the second set of fi gures is more 
likely to refl ect the size of the eff orts and the remaining 
needs. Here too, it may make a diff erence for policy makers 
and public opinion in resettlement countries to be informed 
by refugee advocates and the media that 60,000, and not 
two million, refugees are desperately waiting to be granted 
the safety and stability which they hope resettlement will 
provide them.
Towards Improved Understanding of Iraqi 
Displacement
Social scientists have tended to see those displaced from Iraq 
almost exclusively through paradigms developed to account 
for the experience of urban refugees facing extremely dif-
ferent circumstances. Th e caseload of Iraqi refugees has not 
been typical urban refugees of the kind now found through-
out the world. Arguably, the category of urban refugees has 
been too rigid, unable to adequately describe either the situ-
ation of displaced Iraqis or to analyze the universal applic-
ability of programs to assist them.
Th is has prompted several contributors in this issue, 
particularly those with a strong ethnographic insight, to 
engage with Iraqi refugees on a diff erent plane. Distancing 
themselves from policy-informed analytical frameworks, 
they anchor their discussions within current social science 
debates, exploring the nexus between gender and citizen-
ship among women refugees; the dialectic of provisional 
return and place-making; social stratifi cation, class, and 
the eff ects of neo-liberalism on refugees; the production 
and reproduction of state sovereignty by international 
NGOs; the impact of exile on relations within the nuclear 
family and rebuilding of roles and meaning; or migrant’s 
social capital and its role in information sharing about the 
resettlement process.
Essays in this issue also aim to contribute to some crucial 
policy issues: the eff ect on refugees of irregular migration 
and refugee containment measures adopted by the more 
wealthy states; the politics of resettlement, particularly in 
the US and EU; the process of accommodation taking place 
between refugees and host societies and governments in 
countries of the Middle East; the necessity for humanitar-
ian actors to recognize regional and international mobility 
as legitimate coping mechanisms for refugees; and fi nally 
the urgency to look beyond conventional approaches to dur-
able solutions to the plight of the refugees.
Th e three opening contributions examine the legacy of 
previous trends of refugee migration from Iraq, so far largely 
disregarded by scholars and the humanitarian community. 
Th ousands of Iraqis aspiring to reach safety from the regime 
of Saddam Hussein in Australia, which they expected to 
be a liberal asylum country, have spent years stranded in 
transit countries in Southeast Asia with no durable solution 
in sight: they are now joined by new arrivals from Iraq. In 
Middle Eastern host countries, where no stable legal status 
is available to poor refugees, UNHCR has fi tted the pre-
2003 Iraqi caseload into resettlement programs that would 
force some of these long-term refugees to sever the family 
ties they have built in the host country. More fortunate 
escapees from the Baathist regime, who managed to rebuild 
a secure life in exile, have taken advantage of post-2003 
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opportunities to go back to Iraq, only to then realize how 
much home, and their sense of it, had changed, making 
permanent return impossible.
Iraqis Stranded in Indonesia
Sue Hoff man addresses the experience of Iraqi asylum seek-
ers stranded in Indonesia aft er failing to reach Australia 
through irregular migration in the late 1990s. Oft en experi-
encing multiple traumas—from persecution at home to 
unsuccessful boat journeys trying to reach the coast of 
Australia, in several cases resulting in the death of loved 
ones—these refugees are diffi  cult to resettle, because they 
represent the old caseload of pre-2003 refugees from Iraq. 
Th ey have fallen through the gaps of the international refu-
gee protection system and their experience of “wasted lives” 
is poignant. Th is signifi cant group is at the core of recent 
policy debates in Australia, not least because of the con-
tinuous furor over boat arrivals and the centrality of anti-
refugee rhetoric in political discourse (blaming Iraqis, and 
other asylum seekers, as “queue-jumpers”). Th e contribu-
tion documents the action of UNHCR and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) in Indonesia and high-
lights the essential problem with Australian demoniza-
tion—that there is, eff ectively, no regional queue for them to 
“jump.” Th e paper also accounts for arrival, along the same 
routes, of new Iraqis fl eeing the Middle East aft er 2003, and 
the reasons behind the refugees’ choice of this migratory 
route.
Iraqi Women Returning from Australia
Katie Vasey examines the experience of Iraqi women who 
relocated to Australia as part of Australia’s Refugee and 
Humanitarian Program during the years of international 
sanctions against Iraq, and who returned to visit their 
homeland aft er the fall of Saddam Hussein. Th e author 
explores these women’s experiences of provisional return 
to Iraq, and questions how their return infl uences their 
“home” making in Australia. Th rough narratives of long-
ing, belonging, return to Iraq and return to Australia, Vasey 
interrogates the complex, contradictory, and ambivalent 
relationships that Iraqi women developed with both their 
host and home countries and how this impacted upon their 
well-being. Iraqi women expected to experience a feeling of 
well-being upon return to Iraq, as they stepped back into the 
“home country,” an idealized place that had allowed them to 
cope with the anxieties of exile. Such feelings of well-being, 
security, and being “at home” crumbled with the realization 
that the social environment had irreversibly changed, and 
that returning permanently to Iraq was impossible. Th is 
realization was not only based on the fact that the country 
had, in their absence, been subjected to ongoing destruction 
and devastation, but also related to the transformations they 
had undergone in Australia.
Divorced Iraqi Women in Jordan
Susan MacDougall explores the nexus between divorce, 
immigration laws, and refugee status for Iraqi women in 
Jordan who had arrived in the country before 2003 and were 
previously married to Jordanian men. Th e legal systems 
eff ectively fence off  divorced women in Jordan, with child 
custody laws preventing them from leaving and citizenship 
laws denying them the possibility of naturalization, reinfor-
cing their vulnerability and social exclusion. Th ese women 
register with UNHCR as an alternative to their lack of 
status, but are funnelled into a refugee management regime 
that envisions Jordan merely as a place of transit for refu-
gees. Th is is inappropriate for women who have lived in the 
country for over a decade and have children with Jordanian 
citizenship.  Central to the discussion are issues of gender 
and citizenship, or rather how citizenship is gendered in 
particular ways in countries of the Middle East, and how 
the refugee regime is ill-suited to provide durable solutions 
to women whose situation does not fi t neatly into existing 
legal categories.
Class and Rejection of the “Refugee” Label
By introducing the class variable, Elisa Pascucci off ers a 
complex view of what displacement means to those who do 
not want to be called “refugee.” Th e author challenges typ-
ical portrayals of Iraqis in the Middle East while prompting 
the reader to consider the ways in which vulnerability and 
class status may coexist. Her informants underplay eth-
nic and religious diff erences, and emphasize rather social 
stratifi cation, past or created by displacement, as the most 
divisive factor among Iraqis. Class divides in exile between 
those who can maintain stability and security through 
fi nancial capital, taking advantage of neo-liberal investment 
policies and unconcerned by the regime of international 
refugee assistance, and those who cannot, or who cannot 
any more aft er a slow process of downward social mobility 
during which they strived to maintain social status through 
remittances and/or savings. What Pascucci deems “middle-
class anxieties” about children’s education and standards of 
living pose challenges to international assistance providers 
used to dealing with other types of refugee vulnerabilities. 
Pascucci reminds us that, beyond the focus of humanitarian 
agencies and legal scholars on the legal and policy context 
of reception in host countries, social and economic factors 
are strong determinants of the refugee experience. She also 
argues that neo-liberal policies and the political economy 
of bilateral relations (such as trade and investment linking 
countries of origin and settlement of the displaced) need 
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to be factored into any meaningful analysis of the refugee 
experience and context of vulnerability.
 INGOs and State Sovereignty
Sophia Hoff mann takes the reader to a diff erent plane—that 
of humanitarianism—unveiling the underlying tendency 
among mainstream INGOs to work within social relations 
established by and, in essence, reproducing the hegemonic 
power of state sovereignty. INGO practices towards Iraqi 
refugees in Damascus reveal how the “sovereign ideal” of 
territory, nation, and government informs techniques of 
migration management, which in turn reproduces this 
ideal. Th e author makes a point crucial to an understanding 
of how the humanitarian regime—whose perspective has 
dominated the literature on Iraqi refugees—has also blurred 
an appreciation of the variety of Iraqi experiences in exile 
and in migration. She notes that professional INGOs were 
prevented by the Syrian government from amassing know-
ledge about the Iraqi population and could not conduct the 
needs assessments that usually form the basis of aid-projects. 
INGOs in Damascus thus based their interventions largely 
on assumptions about the Iraqi population, which fl owed 
from established ideas and tropes about refugees, intimately 
connected to sovereignty and sovereign exclusions. INGO 
rhetoric, and the academic production that adheres to this 
rhetoric, reduce the extremely varied existence of Iraqis in 
exile, which also includes successes, opportunities, strength, 
health, and self help, to that of suff ering and weakness, and 
in this contribute to the construction of sovereignty. Yet, as 
the author notes, refugees negotiate, experience, and sub-
vert in multiple ways the sovereignties projected by the state 
and the INGOs.
Rebuilding Roles and Meaning within the Family
Th e contribution by Muriel Génot—together with Muath 
Asfoor, and Hala Hammad who assisted her in her thera-
peutic engagement with Iraqi refugee children and their 
fathers as part of the activities of the NGO Center for 
Victims of Torture (CVT)—brings to the fore the crucial 
question of how exile aff ects relations within the nuclear 
family. Th e authors account for an innovative experience 
of psychological counselling with Iraqi refugees in Jordan 
responding to a request from fathers who had seen their 
protecting role shattered by violence and displacement. 
CVT off ered to organize regular meetings of small groups 
where fathers and children worked together with counsel-
lors on rebuilding roles and re-establishing communication 
though endowing violence and exile with meanings chil-
dren could access and fathers could utter. One of the key 
contributions of the paper is that humanitarian interven-
tion does not necessarily reproduce existing models as long 
as practitioners are ready to listen, propose, engage on par 
with refugees, and take the risk of innovating. Beyond its 
disciplinary underpinnings, and its value for practitioners, 
the paper makes a particularly strong contribution to the 
literature on refugees’ agency. It demonstrates in a power-
ful yet moving way how, during periods of uncertainty and 
temporariness, such as between fl ight and resettlement, 
refugees can productively engage at the family level to act 
upon their own future.
Information Sharing among Refugees
Adam Saltsman’s focus remains with Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan. He provides insight into the eff ects of information 
sharing (or lack thereof) between international organiza-
tions (especially UNHCR) and displaced populations. Th e 
author argues that information campaigns by international 
refugee agencies oft en falter for two crucial reasons beyond 
resource scarcity. First, agencies disseminating information 
are oft en under pressure to curb the outfl ow of migrants 
from the Global South, and as a result, information provi-
sion has tended to be coloured by eff orts to control or pro-
tect against forced migrants’ movement or desires. Second, 
these agencies do not typically consider or engage with 
migratory capital, including migrants’ informal networks 
for sharing knowledge about the migratory process, oft en 
based on transnational relations. As a case study, the author 
explores the lived experiences of refugees vis-à-vis both 
the offi  cial information from humanitarian agencies and 
their informal networks that are transnational in nature. 
Saltsman makes a compelling case in favour of initiatives 
contributing to migratory capital, a set of resources on 
which forced migrants oft en depend just as much as on the 
protection of international agencies. He argues that, rather 
than relying on a model of universal protocol, UNHCR and 
other agencies should both increase their transparency vis-
à-vis the refugee and engage the sorts of local and trans-
national initiatives that spring up as survival mechanisms 
in contexts of displacement.
Local Accommodation
Dawn Chatty and Nisrine Mansour off er a more policy-
oriented contribution to this issue based on a study of per-
ception among refugees and policy makers in the three 
main host countries of the Middle East, who are found to 
be more pragmatic than the international aid community 
and to broaden the scope for durable solutions. Th e auth-
ors identify an ongoing process of local accommodation 
that takes please in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in lieu of 
offi  cial integration, a term widely rejected because of the 
sensitivity to the protracted Palestinian refugee situation. 
Accommodation is the outcome of new patterns of inter- and 
 Editorial 
11
intra-social relations between host and refugee commun-
ities and within Iraqi communities, and is not problem-free 
as mutual recriminations and competing claims between 
local and refugee communities are reported. Another 
important element the authors highlight is the fl uid move-
ment of Iraqis back and forth to Iraq as an important mech-
anism for improving life opportunities and reducing family 
risk. Mobility is also a common feature of Iraqi exiles’ trans-
national networks, built over decades of displacement from 
Iraq and linking family members scattered on several con-
tinents. Th e authors make a case for recognizing regional 
and transnational mobility as a risk-management strategy 
for refugees for whom the three classic durable solutions are 
largely inapplicable. Th ey also regret that this mobility is 
oft en looked at sceptically by many in the humanitarian aid 
regime as it raises questions regarding how well Iraqis fi t 
into the “category” of refugee.
Return and Remigration
Echoing and complementing Chatty and Mansour’s paper, 
Vanessa Iaria’s essay provides an overview of the complex 
political and economic context within which Iraqis who 
fl ed to Syria or Jordan aft er 2003 make decisions regarding 
return and remigration. She found that Iraqi refugees’ deci-
sion to return is driven less by improvements in Iraq than 
by their desire to rebuild their lives back home and over-
come the diffi  cult legal and socio-economic conditions in 
neighbouring countries. However, the micro and macro 
transformations occurring in post-Saddam Iraq also have 
a strong bearing on refugees’ return and reintegration in 
their home communities. In the absence of security at home 
and durable perspectives in a neighbouring country, sev-
eral of the Iraqis Iaria interviewed engage in transnational 
mobility and livelihoods as a survival mechanism. Th e 
article makes two notable contributions to refugee policy. 
One is that the voluntary repatriation of refugees cannot be 
interpreted solely as an evidence of progress in a series of 
post-confl ict issues, including restoration of security and 
political stability. Th e other is that the international refugee 
regime’s concern with governing refugees’ movements aft er 
repatriation by stopping remigration may hamper the nat-
ural transnational practices that refugees have developed as 
alternative livelihood strategies in the absence of other, dur-
able solutions.
Limits of Th ird-Country Resettlement
Chantal Berman’s closing contribution stands as a counter-
point, illustrating the inadequacy of third-country resettle-
ment as the main durable solution envisioned so far by the 
humanitarian regime for Iraqi refugees. Th e rationale for 
resettlement policies is to be found elsewhere than in the 
humanitarian needs of the refugees. Using a detailed com-
parative policy focus, the author examines US and EU poli-
cies regulating the selection and admission of Iraqi refugees 
since 2003, focusing on the divergent political priorities 
and structural considerations underpinning variations in 
resettlement levels during this time. Th e author argues that 
US resettlement of Iraqi refugees is primarily an element of 
foreign policy, defi ned by strategic objectives in Iraq and the 
surrounding region, whereas admissions to the EU refl ect 
ongoing intra-European debates surrounding the construc-
tion and modifi cation of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS). While Europeans opposed to Iraqi resettle-
ment have argued for sole US responsibility for Iraqis’ 
humanitarian needs, Bush Administration offi  cials justi-
fi ed policies of minimal resettlement through a causational 
de-linking of the US invasion and the ensuing refugee crisis. 
Refugee resettlement (or a calculated lack thereof) remains 
one tool among many in the diplomatic and strategic arsenal 
of the United States on a global scale. Finally, comparing 
US and EU policies vis-à-vis Iraqi refugees raises questions 
about states’ accountability for refugee-producing policies, 
and about the corresponding levels of aid and resettlement 
required to off set this “responsibility.”
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